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Motivation and cognitive capacity are key factors in people’s everyday struggle with
uncertainty. However, the exact nature of their interplay in various contexts still needs
to be revealed. The presented paper reports on two experimental studies which
aimed to examine the joint consequences of motivational and cognitive factors for
preferences regarding incomplete information expansion. In Study 1 we demonstrate
the interactional effect of motivation and cognitive capacity on information preference.
High need for closure resulted in a stronger relative preference for expectancy-
inconsistent information among non-depleted individuals, but the opposite among
cognitively depleted ones. This effect was explained by the different informative value
of questions in comparison to affirmative sentences and the potential possibility of
assimilation of new information if it contradicts prior knowledge. In Study 2 we further
investigated the obtained effect, showing that not only questions but also other kinds
of incomplete information are subject to the same dependency. Our results support the
expectation that, in face of incomplete information, motivation toward closure may be
fulfilled efficiently by focusing on expectancy-inconsistent pieces of data. We discuss
the obtained effect in the context of previous assumptions that high need for closure
results in a simple processing style, advocating a more complex approach based on the
character of the provided information.
Keywords: need for closure, uncertainty reduction, cognitive strategy, cognitive capacity, knowledge formation,
information processing, confirmation bias
INTRODUCTION
Although some degree of uncertainty in our lives may be stimulating, too much of it could
be uncomfortable, particularly if it concerns self-uncertainty or uncertainty about matters that
directly reflect on one’s self-concept (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Gudykunst, 1985; Levine, 1985;
Sorrentino and Short, 1986; Kruglanski, 2004; Mendes et al., 2007). Generally, people strive to
reduce feelings of uncertainty about themselves, their social world and their place within it: they
like to know who they are and how to behave, and who others are and how they might behave.
But, there are also differences between individuals in terms of tolerance of uncertainty and thus
the strategies used to cope with it (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Smock, 1955; Rokeach, 1960; Bunder,
1962; Rydell and Rosen, 1966; Kagan, 1972; Sorrentino and Short, 1986; Neuberg and Newsom,
1993; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994; Cialdini et al., 1995; Bar-Tal et al., 1997). One of these
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characteristics is the need for closure, described as the tendency
to reduce the feeling of discomfort experienced in the face of
cognitive uncertainty through the rapid formulation and brief
validation of a hypothesis (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994).
Some research has demonstrated that focusing on expectancy-
consistent information allows individuals with high need for
closure to navigate a stream of ambiguous information, most
of which challenges their a priori expectancy (Driscoll et al.,
1991; Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000;
Skowronski et al., 2013). However, there are some findings
showing that higher need for closure may sometimes lead
to reducing uncertainty via processing expectancy–inconsistent
information (Sherman et al., 1998, 2004; Kemmelmeier, 2015).
Thus, in our study we focus on the relationship between
need for closure and preference for expectancy-inconsistent
information as a strategy to reduce uncertainty. As previous
research focused on searching for information in the form
of affirmative sentences (i.e., individuals are provided with
complete, ready to process information, e.g., “Took money
he/she found in the street to a police station.”), we focus on
situations in which individuals search for information to be
acquired (i.e., unanswered questions, incomplete information to
be extended; e.g., “Did he/she take money he/she found in the
street to a police station?”). Since a person faced with incomplete
information does not know in advance whether the full meaning
of this information will be consistent or inconsistent with
the hypothesis under consideration, increased need for closure
relates to a stronger tendency to prefer expectancy-inconsistent
questions.
In addition, processing of information which contradicts pre-
existing beliefs is effortful and needs cognitive capacity (Piaget,
1928; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Crocker et al., 1983; Stangor
and McMillan, 1992). Thus, we predicted that the preference
for expectancy-inconsistent information provided in incomplete
form (i.e., a question to be asked), would become a preference
for expectancy-consistent information when cognitive capacity is
depleted.
Need for Closure and Preferences
for Expectancy-Consistent
and -Inconsistent Information as
Different Strategies of Uncertainty
Reduction
Some research has demonstrated that need for closure is usually
related to reducing uncertainty via restricted use of relevant
cues or crude categories, which often leads to biased judgments,
stereotyping or prejudice (e.g., Driscoll et al., 1991; Shah et al.,
1998; Kruglanski et al., 2002, 2009). Moreover, it has been shown
that need for closure leads to actively searching for information
that supports preexisting views and/or avoiding disconfirming
information, be it in the domain of attitudes, beliefs, or
stereotypes. For example, Dijksterhuis et al. (1996) demonstrated
that need for closure increased the ability to memorize
stereotype-consistent information in order to confirm closure
regarding the characteristics of the target group the participants
read about at the beginning of the procedure. As a consequence,
need for closure positively correlated with more stereotypical
evaluation of the target group, and negatively with preference
for stereotype-inconsistent information. Also, Kossowska and
Bar-Tal (2013) demonstrated that when participants expected
to successfully achieve closure, higher need for closure led
them to recall relatively less stereotype-inconsistent information,
while there was no statistically significant difference in the
amount of stereotype-consistent information recalled. These
phenomena may be viewed as a specific cases of confirmation
bias, understood as seeking and interpreting evidence in
favor of beliefs, expectations or hypothesis (Nickerson, 1998).
However, we decided to use the term “expectancy-consistent
information search” in the current paper for two reasons.
Firstly, the term “confirmation bias” carries the presumption
that such behavior is somehow wrong, but in fact, it could
be efficient both in terms of achieving the desired state
of closure (Kruglanski and Mayseless, 1988) and in terms
of real-life decision making (e.g., Klayman and Ha, 1987).
Secondly, as Nickerson (1998, p. 175) stated, conformation
bias is “a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises”, thus
using this term in our research which was not designed to
study this phenomenon may lead to overgeneralization. In
conclusion, we use the term “search for expectancy-consistent
information” (as the complement of “search for expectancy-
inconsistent information” which we actually focus on) in the
entire text, but some of the readers may find our results
interesting also in the broader context of confirmation bias
research.
Thus, it seems that when individuals have just formulated a
hypothesis, need for closure is manifested in strong avoidance
or even a tendency to ignore the new, contradicting information
because it endangers the comfortable state of closure (Roets
et al., 2015 for review). As preference-consistent information
reduces uncertainty, evokes positive associations, and has positive
implications for the self, refuting inconsistent information is the
most effective way for individuals high in need for closure to
achieve an enduring and stable uncertainty reduction.
Thus, for high in need for closure individuals, focusing
on what is already known is much more likely to reduce
subjective feelings of uncertainty and affirm existing beliefs.
However, when the majority of the encountered evidence is
not supportive of one’s expectancy, uncertainty is not reduced
and existing beliefs are not enhanced when participants dwell
on expectancy-consistent information (cf. Sherman et al., 1998,
2004; Kemmelmeier, 2015). Rather, in order to affirm existing
beliefs, need for closure may lead to paying attention to
information that does challenge the previously formulated
expectancy, possibly because thinking about such information
might allow it to be reconciled with the expectancy. For
instance, if high in need for closure individuals expect
Mark to be a highly competent worker, but learn that
he is not very reliable in his work, they might consider
that he was bored and under-challenged, and that he was
wasting his time in the company. Thus, paying attention
to expectancy-inconsistent information might be driven as
much by the motivation to reduce ambiguity and affirm
preexisting beliefs as is attending to expectancy-consistent
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information. In our study we aim to further explore the
relationship between need for closure and preference for
expectancy-inconsistent information as a strategy to reduce
uncertainty.
Preference for Consistency vs.
Inconsistency Depends on the Way
Information Is Provided
The meaning of lack of closure may be inferred from the
definition of need for cognitive closure: if the need for closure is
“the desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward
ambiguity” (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996, p. 264), lack of
closure occurs in situations in which at least one question remains
unanswered, therefore the intensity of this lack perhaps grows in
line with the number of unanswered questions. As a consequence,
high in need for closure individuals confronted with any unclear
issue (e.g., assessing a person’s characteristics) quickly adopt the
first hypothesis (if one has been suggested; see Kemmelmeier,
2015) and tend to ignore contradictory information (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013). It is
widely agreed that acquisition and integration of information
is necessary before knowledge can be formulated (e.g., Popper,
1959; Kruglanski et al., 2009). The term ‘information’ defined as
“facts provided or learned about something or someone” (e.g.,
Oxford’s advanced learner’s dictionary, n.d.) is crucial in this
reasoning. Since all incomplete data, such as an unanswered
question or an excerpt of an opinion, does not provide undeniable
information, it differs in epistemic consequences from affirmative
sentences. The legitimate conclusions of reading the sentences
“He/she paid someone to write an M.A. thesis for him/her.” and
“Did he/she pay someone to write an M.A. thesis for him/her?”
about a person who seems to be honest are different (compare
with, e.g., Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013). Being confronted with
the fact in the former sentence denies the preliminary hypothesis
and may result in contesting, if not altogether ignoring new
information, especially by people who appreciate certainty (i.e.,
high in need for closure individuals). In contrast, posing the latter
sentence only suggests the other possibility and therefore cries
out for an answer which has a high likelihood of being negative
in the light of the previously formulated hypothesis (and even if
it is positive, it can be reconciled). This tendency should increase
with increased need for closure, since increased need for closure
is reflected in intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Roets and Van Hiel,
2008).
Since we do not limit our reasoning solely to questions,
but instead treat this mode of sentence as an exemplar of a
wider category of ‘information to be acquired’ (in contrast to
complete information used in the majority of previous studies;
but see Kruglanski and Mayseless, 1988), we claim that the
consequences of other incomplete information for the epistemic
process should be similar to those of the question. Obviously
a question and an incomplete excerpt of an opinion differs
formally (e.g., “Did he/she pay someone to write an M.A.
thesis for him/her?” vs. “I suspect he/she paid someone to
write an M.A. thesis for him/her because. . .”) but, in contrast
to complete information, both forms do not provide certain
knowledge and rather emphasize the uncertainty about a given
issue. Consequently, we expect both forms to produce similar
effects.
Thus we predict that when individuals are instructed to select
information to be acquired (e.g., “Which question do you prefer
to ask to find out. . .”), need for closure is linked to a preference
for expectancy-inconsistent data. We expected that increased
need for closure leads to less tolerance for the uncertainty evoked
by this kind of incomplete information. As a consequence, a
higher need for closure is linked to finding an answer and
either confirming a hypothesis (when the answer turns out to
be negative, i.e., expectancy-consistent) or reconciling newly
acquired information (when the answer turns out to be positive).
Preference for Inconsistency Requires
Cognitive Capacity
Researchers have argued for a long time that inconsistent
information prompts cognitive efforts to reconcile it with
preexisting knowledge (Piaget, 1928; Hastie and Kumar, 1979;
Crocker et al., 1983; Stangor and McMillan, 1992). In order to
do that, individuals have to engage in a process of assimilation
“to transform perceptions until they are identical to one’s own
thought, i.e., with previous schemas” (Piaget, 1928, p. 174). The
assimilation of information pieces is assumed to be cognitively
effortful as it consists of deliberate and controlled information
processing (Piaget, 1928; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Crocker
et al., 1983; Stangor and McMillan, 1992; Kemmelmeier, 2015).
For example, Kemmelmeier argues that “such [expectancy-
inconsistent] information prompts efforts to reconcile it with
one’s expectancy, with the resulting cognitive elaboration making
expectancy-inconsistent information more memorable than
expectancy-consistent information” (Kemmelmeier, 2015, p. 3;
see also Macrae et al., 1993). Also, researchers on the dual-type
model (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken et al., 1989) and
the unified model (Erb et al., 2003) of information processing
indicate that deliberative information processing requires certain
cognitive capacity (e.g., Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011; Evans
and Stanovich, 2013). For example, Evans and Stanovich (2013)
claim that this kind of cognitive process (i.e., ‘Type 2 process’)
requires working memory capacity and is typically correlated
with capacity limitations and cognitive ability, thus an individual
lacking cognitive capacities is virtually unable to perform
it. Also, Ditto and Lopez (1992) argued that the tendency
to choose preference-consistent information over preference-
inconsistent information is less likely to initiate effortful cognitive
analysis. From this perspective, rather than actively working
to construct justifications for preference-consistent information,
people often unthinkingly accept information they want to
believe “at face value”. Information inconsistent with a preferred
judgment conclusion is, on the other hand, more likely to
initiate an effortful cognitive appraisal in which alternative
explanations for the unwanted information are likely to be
considered, producing uncertainty regarding the validity of the
information.
Moreover, Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011, p. 103) stated
that in the situation of capacity depletion “the individual may be
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loathe to apply rules1 whose implementation requires laborious
computational analyses” and, as a consequence, utilizes only
relatively simple judgmental rules and finds it difficult to assess
their value. Thus high cognitive capacity is a prerequisite
for engaging in the process of information reconciliation,
otherwise it would be more efficient to discard all awkward
questions in order to avoid confronting expectancy-inconsistent
answers that cannot be elaborated due to cognitive ability
deficit.
Since increased need for closure is manifested in intense
experience of uncertainty in the face of a lack of closure
(Roets and Van Hiel, 2008), it leads to the formulation of
as much cohesive knowledge as possible. In the face of an
ambiguous information set, the increased need for closure
sensitizes the subject to expectancy-inconsistent information
because it prompts special attention in order to reconcile it with
already learnt information (e.g., Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Stangor
and McMillan, 1992; Strojny, unpublished doctoral dissertation),
which in turn results in better memory for this information
(Macrae et al., 1993; Kemmelmeier, 2015). If this way of reasoning
is valid, cognitive capacity should be a necessary condition for a
preference for expectancy-inconsistent information. Otherwise,
if cognitive capacity is compromised, a higher need for
closure should increase preference for expectancy-consistent
over inconsistent information as the inability to reconcile
expectancy-inconsistent information is due to cognitive ability
deficit.
On the other hand, individuals low in cognitive capacity
are not only incapable of successfully processing inconsistent
information in order to reconcile it with previous knowledge,
but they may be more likely to prefer expectancy-consistent data
due to their general propensity to behave reflectively. Previous
research has demonstrated that impulsive actions are more
dominant among people lacking the cognitive ability necessary
to override them (Engle, 2002; Barrett et al., 2004). Hofmann
et al. (2008) showed that low-working memory capacity
individuals were more likely to manifest behavior consistent
with their dispositions than inconsistent behavior. Macrae et al.
(1993) also demonstrated that whereas perceivers displayed
preferential recall for stereotype-inconsistent information under
low processing load (higher cognitive capacity), this switched to a
preference for consistent information as task demands increased
(lower cognitive capacity). Thus, low in cognitive capacity people
may be more likely to select expectancy-consistent incomplete
information merely because of their ostensible meaning, even if
the question (or a fragment of information) does not necessarily
mean what it asks, it may do so in the eyes of a cognitively
depleted person.
Thus, bearing in mind that cognitive depletion prevents the
effortful process of information assimilation, we expect that when
participants are depleted, a higher need for closure leads to a
preference for more expectancy-consistent data.
We formulated two hypotheses:
1By the ‘rule’ the authors understand “inferential devices for categorization,
estimation, paired comparisons, and other judgmental tasks that go beyond the
information given” (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011, p. 98), which makes this
term close to ways which may be potentially used to formulate the judgment.
Hypothesis 1: In the face of incomplete information, the level
of need for closure correlates positively with the preference
for expectancy-inconsistent information among individuals
with relatively high cognitive capacity.
Hypothesis 2: In the face of incomplete information, the level of
need for closure correlates negatively with the preference
for expectancy-inconsistent information among individuals
with relatively low cognitive capacity.
Overview of the Study
Although the results of much research leads to the conclusion
that for high need for closure individuals the most preferred
way of uncertainty reduction is to search for expectancy-
consistent information, we think that this is not always true.
Thus, we predict that when individuals are instructed to select
information to be acquired (e.g., “Which question do you
prefer to ask to find out. . .”), need for closure is linked to a
preference for expectancy-inconsistent information. However,
when participants are cognitively depleted, the higher need for
closure leads to a preference for more expectancy-consistent
data.
We tested these hypotheses in two studies. We operationalized
need for closure as a level on a scale (Webster and Kruglanski,
1994). By the term cognitive capacity we meant an individual’s
limited and taxable pool of cognitive resources to process
information (Roets et al., 2013). We experimentally depleted
that pool with a character repetition task (Gilbert and Osborn,
1989; Gilbert and Hixon, 1991) as this manipulation was usually
applied in previous research on epistemic processes (e.g., Bar-Tal
et al., 1999, Study 3; Roets and Van Hiel, 2007, Study 3).
In Study 1 we measured preference for expectancy-consistent
compared to expectancy-inconsistent information with a version
of a classic task (Snyder and Swann, 1978). Kruglanski and
Mayseless (1988) previously used by Kossowska and Bar-Tal
(2013), with modification of sentence mode. Specifically, we
replaced affirmative sentences with interrogative ones while
keeping the content of the former unchanged. In Study 2 we
altered the form of presentation information to be acquired
once again to make sure that the key factor of the obtained
results was not the interrogative sentence mode but rather the
inconclusive way in which the information was provided. This
time we used brief fragments of information which may be
acquired.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
The study included 67 high school students aged 17–20 years
(M = 17.63, SD = 0.62), 61 of whom were women. The gender
disproportion was not intended and resulted from unexpected
uneven interest in participating in the experiment between
both genders. Two participants failed to successfully perform
the cognitive capacity depletion task and were excluded from
the analysis, which left us with a sample of 65 participants
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(M = 17.62, SD = 0.62, 59 women). In exchange for their
participation, each participant could win one of two tickets in a
lottery (each worth approximately $8).
Materials
Need for closure
To assess individual levels of need for closure, we used the Need
for Cognitive Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Due
to controversy regarding the nature of the Decisiveness subscale
(see Roets and Van Hiel, 2007) we excluded items related to this
subscale from the scale. Finally, we analyzed the results obtained
with 27 items belonging to four subscales (Preference for order,
Preference for predictability, Intolerance of ambiguity, Closed-
mindedness) with acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = 0.69,
M = 3.77, SD= 0.40).
Cognitive capacity depletion
In the low cognitive capacity condition, a sequence of eight
characters (e.g., 9KWELB1P) had to be memorized, whereas in
the high cognitive capacity condition, no character had to be
memorized (for a similar manipulation, see e.g., Roets et al.,
2013). The sequence was administered directly before the start
of the main task and subjects were informed that they must keep
it in mind throughout and that at the end of the procedure their
memory of it would be tested.
Preference for expectancy-consistent vs. –inconsistent
information
The dependent variable was measured with a task similar to
the one used in the study by Bar-Tal and Kossowska (2010
Study 3, Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013, Study 1). Participants were
asked to imagine that they had just met a person who at a first
glance appears to be dishonest. This information was intended
to suggest the initial hypothesis about the characteristics of the
target person. Afterward participants were presented with fifteen
questions regarding the preliminary hypothesis; five consistent
(e.g., “Did he cheat during the exam?”), five inconsistent (e.g.,
“Did he return the money found on the street?”) and five
irrelevant (e.g., “Does he read the daily newspaper?”). They were
asked to assess (on 7-point scales) the extent to which each of
the questions would be useful to determine whether the target
person was actually dishonest. We calculated index of preference
for inconsistency as the proportion of preference for inconsistent
questions to the preference for all relevant questions assessed
by participants, multiplied by 100. The greater the score, the
stronger the relative inclination toward expectancy-inconsistent
questions.
Manipulation check
Two questions were used in order to check the effectiveness of
cognitive capacity depletion: “How burdensome was the task?”
and “How hard was the task?”. Questions were answered on a
scales ranging from 1 to 6 (Cronbach’s α = 0.80). At the end
of the study the actual memory of the strings was tested to
eliminate participants who did not understand or failed to follow
the instructions. The minimum performance was set to at least
one correctly recalled character in the correct position. Results of
people who did not meet this criterion were excluded from the
analysis to avoid the risk of analyzing the results of subjects who
were not actually depleted2.
Procedure
Participants were informed that the study concerned the
relationship between cognitive style and judgment during
recruitment. After obtaining informed consent, they were given
materials printed on paper. They were first asked to complete a
need for closure questionnaire. Afterward, they were randomly
assigned to one of the two conditions: if a participant belonged
to the experimental group, they received a random sequence of
characters to be remembered in print. They gave their sheets back
before starting the main task. All the participants were then given
another piece of paper with instructions to imagine they had just
met a person who, at first glance, appears to be dishonest and their
task was to assess the answers to which of the presented questions
would be useful to verify if this person is indeed dishonest. The
last part contained manipulation check questions and a sequence
memory test. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Preliminary Analyses
To check whether the manipulation was effective we used two
questions concerning the onerousness and difficulty of the task.
The experimental group reported a slightly higher capacity
depletion (M = 2.32, SD = 1.11) than the control group
(M = 2.12; SD = 0.99), but the difference was not significant [t
(63) = 0.78, p = 0.44, d = 0.19). Thus, the manipulation may be
assessed to not be effective enough. Similar results were found
in several previous studies (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 1999, Study 3).
Researchers speculated that some participants could merge the
difficulty of the capacity depletion task and the main task because
the manipulation was followed by the main task, which in turn
was followed by the manipulation check, which could also be the
case in the current study. Consequently, it was decided to carry
out the planned analysis, including the manipulation check as
covariate. We also checked the results of secondary task itself,
they indicated that the participants performed, on average, very
well (M = 6.64, SD = 2.37), two participants did not recall one
single character correctly and was excluded from further analysis.
Need for Closure and Preference for
Expectancy-Inconsistent Information
Neither cognitive capacity depletion (Mcontr = 54.1, SD = 7.34,
Mexp = 51.9, SD = 7.14, t(63) = 1.28, p = 0.21, d = 0.3) nor
need for closure (b = –0.015, t(63) = –0.18, p = 0.86, 95% CI:
[–0.18, 0.15]) affected the preference for expectancy-inconsistent
information on their own.
2Results of two participants were excluded. To make sure that this treatment did
not affect the results of analyses we performed re-analysis of the data without
excluding any of the records. The results obtained this way were similar to those
reported below. The only change was in the effect size of the differences between
groups in terms of the manipulation check (before the exclusion d= 0.07; after the
exclusion d = 0.19). This difference confirmed concerns about the effectiveness of
cognitive capacity depletion of the excluded participants.
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Need for Closure and Cognitive Capacity Joint Effect
on the Preference for Expectancy-Inconsistent
Questions
We used PROCESS to test the interactional effect of cognitive
capacity depletion on the relationship between need for closure
and preference for expectancy-inconsistent information (Hayes,
2013, model 1). The influence of gender and age on the
interaction was inspected, but it turned out to be statistically
insignificant and these variables were removed from the analysis.
We found a statistically significant interaction between need for
closure and cognitive capacity (b = –0.35, β = –1.91, SE = 0.17,
p < 0.05, 95% CI [–0.69, –0.01]). The results are shown in
Figure 1. Further analysis of the interaction showed that need
for closure correlated positively with the index of expectancy-
inconsistent questions preference in the control condition (b= –
0.20, β = –2.23, SE = 0.11, p = 0.08, 95% CI: [–0.43, 0.03]).
In the low capacity condition the correlation tended to be the
opposite and became statistically insignificant (b= 0.14, β= 1.56,
SE= 0.12, p= 0.19, 95% CI: [–0.11, 0.39]).
The results of Study 1 are in line with our expectations,
but they did not reach significance level. Thus we cannot
make an unambiguous inference about the nature of the
joint influence of need for closure and cognitive capacity on
expectancy-inconsistent incomplete information. The possible
explanation is that, using the method utilized in Study 1 (and
before by Bar-Tal et al., 1997, 1999; Bar-Tal and Kossowska, 2010;
Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013), it is not possible to be sure
whether the single sentence designed to evoke preliminary
hypothesis about the target person (“At the first glance he
seems dishonest”) fulfilled its role. For some participants, such
information is probably not a sufficiently strong argument in
favor of the initial hypothesis about the target person. If this was
true, it could have reduced the size of the effect. We decided to
alter the method used in Study 2 in order to test the reliability
and increase the internal validity of the obtained results.
STUDY 2
Study 1 provided the reasons to argue that need for closure
leads to searching for expectancy-inconsistent information
supplementation in order to achieve certainty. According to our
predictions, the effect occurred only among people in the control
group with relatively high cognitive capacity, the necessary
condition of successful information reconciliation. The purpose
of Study 2 was to verify the previously obtained effect with the
use of a different form of information to be acquired. Because
of the doubts regarding the previously used task, it was decided
to use a different method developed by Frey (e.g., Frey, 1986;
Jonas et al., 2003; Fischer et al., 2005, 2011). According to this
method, participants were asked to decide whether a manager’s
contract should be extended or not. They were provided with
shortened opinions about the manager. They task was to select
opinions which they wanted to read in the full version. The main
advantage of the new method was that it enabled us to increase
the generality of the results, due to replacement of questions
with brief fragments of opinions which were expanded if selected.
Moreover, because the method used in Study 2 allows participants
to formulate preliminary impression on their own, we were able
to eliminate the doubts about the initial hypothesis induction
mentioned in the discussion in Study 1.
Method
Participants
High school students aged 18–20 years took part in the procedure
(N = 94, M = 18.65, SD = 0.66) including 72 women, 20 men,
and 2 subjects who did not specify their gender. One participant
withdrew before the end of the procedure. During preliminary
analysis the results of 20 participants were eliminated due to
the previously determined reasons described below (cognitive
capacity load task failure or inability to formulate the preliminary
hypothesis). We conducted analysis of 74 subjects aged 18–20
(M = 18.67, SD= 0.67): 56 women, 17 men, and one participant
with unspecified gender. Subjects were invited to participate
in the study after obtaining the consent of the school head
and teacher present during the procedure. All participants were
unaware of the purpose of the research and hypotheses. The
participation in a lottery for two shopping vouchers worth 25
zlotys ($8) each served as the reward for subjects.
Materials
To assess individual level of need for closure we used the same
version of the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale as in Study 1
(Webster and Kruglanski, 1994) (Cronbach’s α= 0.693 ). We also
used the same manipulation of cognitive load as in Study 1.
Information to be acquired preference
In order to measure the dependent variable, we employed a task
similar to the classic selective exposure decision paradigm, in
which participants were asked to decide whether a manager’s
contract should be extended or not (e.g., Frey, 1986; Jonas et al.,
2003; Fischer et al., 2005, 2011). Participants were asked to
imagine they had just inherited a fashion store. The first decision
they needed to take concerned the shop manager’s contract
extension. Participants were briefly informed that the manager’s
performance over the last year had been a mix of success and
failure. The initial information consisted of a balanced number
of pieces of information: positive (e.g., “Augustynski introduced a
new line of clothes designed for younger customers which turned
out to be a success.”) and negative (e.g., “Some of the regular
customers were lost because they were not attracted by the new
fashion collections.”). Afterward, subjects were given another
sheet of paper with 10 two-sentence abstracts of statements about
the manager. The number of opinions was also balanced; five
were positive (e.g., “He introduced new rules, not everyone likes
them but they bring us high premiums. I would like to extend
his contract. . .”) and five were negative (e.g., “Nobody likes to
deal with indecisive people. If it were up to me, I would not
3The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha was acceptable (see Clark and Watson, 1995)
and virtually equal in both studies (0.693 in Study 1 and 0.686 in Study 2). Since it
turned out to be lower than in the initial study performed during scale adaptation
(Kossowska, 2003), we find it important to highlight that the questionnaire was
handled according to common practice and all of the reversed questions were
transformed prior to analysis.
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FIGURE 1 | Interaction effect between need for closure and cognitive capacity on expectancy-inconsistent questions preference (Study 1). Error bars
represent standard errors.
extend the contract. . .”). Subjects were informed that every brief
statement had the full version (approximately half a page of text)
and asked to choose up to five statements which they wanted to
receive in the complete form (i.e., found most useful to read in
terms of a final decision). They were informed that they would be
given a complete version of the chosen opinions. We asked the
participants about their initial decision twice: the question “What
is your preliminary decision right now?” appeared on both sheets.
In order to eliminate results of participants who did not manage
to formulate a certain preliminary decision on the basis of the first
piece of information (14 people), we analyzed data only for those
whose both preliminary decisions were consistent.
The index of preference for expectancy-inconsistent infor-
mation was defined as the number of selected opinions consistent
with the preliminary decision subtracted from the number of
selected opinions inconsistent with the preliminary decision. The
score was in the range –5 to 5: the bigger the number, the stronger
the relative preference for expectancy-inconsistent information.
Manipulation check
As in Study 1, we used the two questions to check the
effectiveness of cognitive capacity depletion: “How burdensome
was the task?” and “How hard was the task?”. Questions
were answered on a scale of 1–6 (Cronbach’s α = 0.68). At
the end of the study the actual memory of the strings was
tested to eliminate participants who did not understand or
failed to follow the instructions: the minimum performance
was set to at least one correctly recalled character in the
correct position. Results of participants who did not meet this
criterion (six people) were excluded from the analysis to avoid
the risk of analyzing the results of subjects who were not
depleted.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1 with the
exception of the task used to measure the dependent variable.
Participants were informed that they were taking part in a
study on business decisions. After obtaining from them informed
consent, participants were given instructions printed on paper.
Participants were first requested to complete the need for closure
questionnaire, after which the subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the two conditions. All participants were then given
more instructions, and members of the experimental group also
received a random sequence of characters to be remembered.
Next, subjects gave back their sheets before starting the task
measuring the dependent variable. The last part contained
a manipulation check questionnaire and a sequence memory
test. After collecting all the data, subjects were debriefed and
thanked.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Preliminary Analyses
In the first instance those who changed their initial decision
or failed to recall the minimum number of characters in the
cognitive load task (16 women, 3 men, 1 gender non-specific)
were excluded from further analysis. The mean response for the
two questions about the onerousness and difficulty of the task
was intended to be used as a manipulation efficiency indicator.
Similar to Study 1, the difference between the control (M = 2.31,
SD = 0.95) and experimental (M = 2.16, SD = 1.00) group was
not statistically significant (t(72) = 0.622, p = 0.54, d = 0.15).
Again, the manipulation was not effective enough. It was decided
to perform the planned analysis, including the manipulation
check results in the model as a covariate.
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Similarly to Study 1 we checked the results of secondary task
itself, they also indicated that the participants performed, on
average, very well (M = 6.15, SD = 2.83), six participants did
not recall one single character correctly and was excluded from
further analysis.
Neither cognitive capacity depletion (Mcontr = 1.81,
SD = 2.32, Mexp = 1.37, SD = 2.35, t(72) = 0.789, p = 0.43,
d= 0.19) nor need for closure (β= 0.059, b= 0.013, t(72)= 0.50,
p = 0.62, 95% CI: [–0.39, 0.65]) affected the preference for
expectancy-inconsistent information.
The Joint Effect of Need for Closure and Cognitive
Capacity on Preference for Expectancy-Inconsistent
Questions
We used PROCESS in order to test the interactional effect of need
for closure and cognitive capacity depletion on the preference
for expectancy-inconsistent information (Hayes, 2013, model 1).
The influence of gender and age on the interaction was inspected,
but these variables turned out to be statistically insignificant
and were removed from the analysis. We found a significant
interaction between motivation and cognitive capacity (b = –
0.16, β= –0.80, SE= 0.05, p < 0.005, 95% CI [–0.27, –0.05]). The
results are shown in Figure 2. Further analysis of the interaction
showed that need for closure correlated positively with the index
of expectancy-inconsistent information preference in the control
condition (b = –0.097, β = –0.99, SE = 0.05, p = 0.03, 95% CI:
[–0.19, –0.01]). In the low capacity condition, the correlation was
the opposite and also statistically significant (b = 0.06, β = 0.63,
SE= 0.03, p= 0.04, 95% CI: [0.002, 0.122]).
The results of Study 2 confirmed our hypothesis that the
pattern of results was identical to that obtained in the previous
study. Again it was revealed that in the face of incomplete
information, the level of need for closure correlates positively
with the preference for expectancy-inconsistent information
among high cognitive capacity and negatively among low
cognitive capacity subjects. This time the results were even clearer
in terms of statistical significance. Additionally, Study 2 provided
evidence that incomplete information does not strictly need to
mean ‘unanswered questions’ as this time we used brief excerpts
from people’s opinions which would be extended when subjects
choose them instead of the questions used in Study 1. This
modification did not influence the pattern of results.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to explore the relationship
between the need for cognitive closure, cognitive capacity, and
the preference for expectancy-inconsistent information as a
strategy to reduce uncertainty. According to our predictions, the
behavior of individuals confronted with a choice of incomplete
information (i.e., questions or partial opinions) was different than
when individuals were confronted with complete information
(e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 1996), as happened in previous studies.
When confronted with complete pieces of information people
high in need for closure tend to focus on those which are
expectancy-consistent, but when confronted with incomplete
information which is going to be expanded, higher need for
closure leads to a stronger preference for expectancy-inconsistent
information. Our results are consistent with previous findings
showing that the preference for schema-consistent information
is not the only possible strategy for achieving closure as
in certain situations it may be altered in favor of schema-
inconsistent information. Higher need for closure leads to
a stronger preference for expectancy-inconsistent information
because, in fact, this kind of information does not provide
certain details in their original form, however, due to its
speculative nature it highlights the lack of knowledge on a
given issue which may be easily filled by closer examination of
that information (e.g., asking for a complete opinion). Closer
examination of the expectancy-inconsistent information may
result in twofold alternative consequences: disconfirmation of
the suggestion contained in the incomplete information (e.g.,
negative answer for a question) or acquisition of new and
certain information which contradicts an existing preliminary
hypothesis, which could potentially undo closure. One could
say – and indeed we agree – that this strategy is ‘risky’, but
only when an individual’s cognitive capacity is reduced. In this
situation, acquisition of contradicting information should result
in a weaker feeling of closure, otherwise an individual is able to
reconcile this information and therefore minimize the negative
impact on closure (Piaget, 1928; Hastie and Kumar, 1979;
Crocker et al., 1983; Stangor and McMillan, 1992; Kemmelmeier,
2015). Consequently, we expected that cognitive capacity would
play a moderating role in this relationship.
Despite the fact that unanswered questions may be harmful for
establishing cognitive closure, finding certain (i.e., contradictory)
answers may be also problematic, especially for individuals low in
cognitive capacity. The preferred strategy among people striving
for certainty is the reconciliation of contradictory information
which is effective but also effortful in terms of cognitive capacity
(Piaget, 1928; Hastie and Kumar, 1979; Crocker et al., 1983;
Stangor and McMillan, 1992; Kemmelmeier, 2015). We therefore
expected that only non-depleted individuals would behave in
such a way, whereas low cognitive capacity subjects were expected
to prefer relatively less expectancy-inconsistent information due
to their inability to invest effort in reconciling contradictory
information. According to our predictions, cognitive capacity
played a moderating role between need for closure and
information to be acquired preference. In both studies, higher
need for closure caused non-depleted individuals to have
a stronger preference for acquiring expectancy-inconsistent
information (questions in Study 1 and brief opinions to be
extended in Study 2). In contrast, higher need for closure leads
to a stronger preference for acquiring expectancy-consistent
information among low cognitive capacity subjects.
The main difference between the presented studies and those
previously conducted is the informative value of the information
utilized used in the main task. While previous studies, with one
exception, utilized complete information pieces, we decided to
replace them with somehow incomplete information (questions
to be asked or brief opinions to be expanded). This provided
us with the argument for our expectation that when individuals
are instructed to select information to be acquired (e.g., “Which
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 395
fpsyg-07-00395 March 18, 2016 Time: 13:13 # 9
Strojny et al. Inconsistent Information Reduces Uncertainty
FIGURE 2 | Interaction effect between need for closure and cognitive capacity on expectancy-inconsistent information preference (Study 2). Error
bars represent standard errors.
question do you prefer to ask to find out. . .”), need for closure
is linked to stronger relative preference for the expectancy-
inconsistent one.
Although the issue of people’s preference for incomplete
information in terms of its consistency with previous
expectations has not been studied in the last three decades,
there is one study which should be addressed here. Kruglanski
and Mayseless (1988, Study 2) used a task similar to the one
used in Study 1. Subjects were instructed that their task would
be to select interview questions they would use to verify the
occupation of the target person. The study revealed that subjects
under time pressure (which was labeled as “high need for closure
condition”) selected relatively less diagnostic questions. One
could say that this result challenges our own, however, we believe
it does not on the basis of at least two reasons.
Firstly, need for cognitive closure is a complex characteristic
(Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 1997;
Kruglanski, 2004) which cannot be fully influenced by time
pressure manipulation. Theorists have claimed (e.g., Kruglanski
and Webster, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 1997; Kruglanski, 2004)
that need for cognitive closure is related to two tendencies:
urgency and permanence. The urgency tendency is defined as the
“inclination to ’seize‘ on closure quickly”, hence it is directly related
to haste in the epistemic process. However, the permanence
tendency seems to be unrelated to time pressure manipulation
since it refers to “the dual inclination (a) to preserve, or ‘freeze’
on, past knowledge and (b) to safeguard future knowledge”
(Kruglanski and Webster, 1996, p. 265).
Secondly, time pressure manipulation is related not only
to motivational consequences, but also the tax on cognitive
resources (Roets et al., 2008). It is therefore possible that
merely time pressure manipulation (without at least controlling
dispositional level of need for closure) may lead to the results
with inseparable motivational and cognitive antecedents. To
sum up, even though the results of Study 1 and the discussed
experiment (Kruglanski and Mayseless, 1988, Study 2) are not
compatible with each other, they also do not contradict each
other. Nevertheless further investigation on the issue of the
combined influence of the dispositional and situationally induced
need for closure on the preference for information to be acquired
is needed4.
The goal of our study was to initialize the investigation on
the joint effect of the need for closure and cognitive capacity
on the preference for expectancy-inconsistent information which
needs to be elaborated. As we expected, the conclusions turned
out to be different than the results of analogous studies which
analyzed selective focus on complete information. Nevertheless,
the two studies presented in this paper are the first step into
that interesting area as we have identified two directions which
future research should pursue: the consequences of situationally
induced need for closure for selection of information to be
acquired, and further exploring of the role of cognitive capacity
in the discovered relationship.
As we argued above, need for closure understood as a
disposition, which we focus on, is one of only two ways of
operationalizing this variable. The data provided by Kruglanski
and Mayseless (1988) are enough to stipulate that our results
address only the dispositional need for cognitive closure. The
4Our postulates on the study of Kruglanski and Mayseless (1988), could not be
fulfilled at hat time since the tool assessing the dispositional level of need for
closure was designed in early nineties (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Thus the
most desirable way to ensure our way of reasoning would be replicating our
studies with the original task utilized by Kruglanski and Mayseless (1988), however,
unfortunately the tool has been lost (personal communication, 26 March, 2015).
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questions of the interaction between situationally induced
need for closure and cognitive capacity remain unanswered.
Therefore, we think that future research should investigate
the role of situationally induced need for closure with regard
to cognitive capacity. Perhaps the exact method of need for
closure manipulation will play a role here as, for example,
Bukowski et al. (2013) showed that manipulation of need for
closure via time pressure has different consequences for an
epistemic process than a goal-based one; Bukowski et al. (2013)
speculate that the differences may have occurred due to the
different consequences of manipulation itself for a cognitive
capacity. It is possible that goal-based manipulation of need for
closure (e.g., Bukowski et al., 2013; Kossowska and Jas´ko, 2013)
which does not directly tap cognitive resources will result in
a pattern of results similar to the one obtained in the present
investigation.
Also the issue of the role of ‘cognitive capacity’ itself needs
further exploration. In the current studies cognitive capacity was
operationalized narrowly as cognitive load due to a character-
repetition task. Since other researchers identified intriguing
interactions between need for closure and other objective (e.g.,
working memory capacity; Kossowska and Jas´ko, 2013) or even
subjective (e.g., Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013) abilities in regard
to an epistemic process, it seems interesting to examine whether
the effect presented in the current paper is strictly limited to
cognitive capacity manipulated by load or, perhaps, will arise also
with regard to more general cognitive abilities. According to our
interpretation of the results, we expect that every factor which
impedes effortful inconsistent information reconciliation should
affect the need for closure-information preference relationship in
a similar manner.
Potential Limitations
Some potential limitations of the present studies should be
acknowledged. Firstly, the cognitive capacity manipulation
yielded a non-significant effect on the manipulation check.
Although the absence of a significant manipulation check
does not necessarily invalidate an entire study (see, Sigall
and Mills, 1998), it should be acknowledged that the results
should be treated with caution since they may appear due to
other mechanisms. However, as mentioned above, the lack of
differences in the manipulation check in the case of cognitive
capacity manipulation like the one we used is nothing new (e.g.,
Bar-Tal et al., 1999, Study 3) and may appear due to the timeline
of the study. Hence, given that a similar manipulation yielded
significant effects on the manipulation check in several studies
(e.g., Roets and Van Hiel, 2007; Roets et al., 2013), we believe the
problem is likely to be related to the manipulation check rather
than the manipulation itself.
One could say that main effect of need for closure should
be expected in a study designed like ours. However, we did not
expect the main effects of mere need for closure nor cognitive
capacity, because no effects of those variables had been reported
previously in studies utilizing a similar method of dependent
variable measurement. The main task was based on assessing the
usefulness of information pieces, not on cognitive performance
whatsoever, thus cognitive capacity was expected to be irrelevant
to results. Also the relationship between need for closure and
the relative preference for expectancy-inconsistent questions was
expected to be null since the memory-based version of the very
same task had been used in two previous studies (Bar-Tal and
Kossowska, 2010, Study 3; Kossowska and Bar-Tal, 2013, Study
1) and the authors reported no correlation between need for
closure and analogous index. This is consistent with the findings
of Bar-Tal et al. (2010) that mere epistemic motivation may not
be enough to affect information processing style, in fact a certain
level of ability may be needed to do that (Bar-Tal et al., 1997,
1999; Bar-Tal and Kossowska, 2010; Kossowska and Bar-Tal,
2013).
The last possible limitation, which was in fact addressed
in Study 2, regards the well-known effect of positive–negative
asymmetry in social discrimination (Skowronski and Carlston,
1989; Lewicka et al., 1992). In Study 1 we labeled the target person
(whose attitude would be verified) as “dishonest” and presented
questions concerning morality rather than ability. Thus, the
alternative mechanism could be taken into consideration as it
was possible that questions concerning negative issues, which
are known to be more diagnostic in the moral context, were
preferred over those which concerned positive issues. However,
Kossowska and Bar-Tal (2013, Study 1) in their study used
the very same task, but in addition to ‘dishonest’ used three
additional labels (‘honest,’ ‘friendly,’ ‘unfriendly’) in order to
check whether the effect of asymmetry would occur. It turned out
that the label did not affect information processing in any way.
Additionally, in Study 2 we changed the main task, which allowed
us to discard this doubt: firstly, this time task did not concern
moral issues at all; secondly we did not suggest a preliminary
hypothesis; last but not least, the list of brief opinions presented
to participants contained information neutral in the context of a
moral vs. ability problem (see examples presented above in which
only two out of ten information pieces could be interpreted as
evaluating ability: “Augustynski has a good relationships with
the media” and “Augustynski’s employment has brought financial
benefits”). Thus we believe that the issue of positive-negative
asymmetry does not apply to the effect presented in the current
paper.
CONCLUSION
It was generally agreed that higher levels of need for closure
are related to expectancy-consistent information preference.
However, the present studies show a more complex picture,
suggesting that cognitive capacity and the form of information
presentation also play a role in addition to epistemic motivation.
In particular, it was shown that in the face of incomplete
information pieces, people prefer relatively more expectancy-
inconsistent ones, which contrasts with previous research
on complete information. Furthermore, the key role of
cognitive capacity was documented and it turned out that the
effect mentioned above takes place only among non-depleted
participants, otherwise the relationship is reversed. The present
studies highlight the important interplay between motivational
and cognitive characteristics on one hand and the form of
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information presentation on the other, therefore suggesting that
the current association between need for closure and rigidity may
be an oversimplification as in certain situations individuals who
are highly motivated toward closure may also be open to varied
information.
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